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RUNNING HEAD:  Poverty Alleviation through Partnerships 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  While investigating the role of business and accepting that profitable partnerships 
are the primary solution for poverty alleviation, we voice certain concerns that we hope will 
extend the authors’ discourse in Alleviating Poverty through Profitable Partnerships. We present 
a model that we believe can serve as an effective framework for addressing these issues.  We 
then establish the imperative of inclusive growth.  Here we engage with the necessity of 
formulating strategies that focus on the pace and, importantly, the pattern of economic growth, 
including its social and cultural dimensions. We also deliberate on the parameters of inclusive 
growth with the overriding objective of ensuring that multiple strata of society share the benefits 
of globalization.  Turning to the critical role of institutions in promoting social welfare, we 
explore the impact of government policy vis-à-vis the leverage enjoyed by other social 
institutions. Despite the reality that state and private interests often operate at cross purposes, we 
argue that government must still be an integral part of the solution matrix.  With direction from 
other social institutions, entrepreneurship can be unleashed to tackle endemic poverty prevalent 
in the base of the pyramid.  We then provide an in-depth case study in which the availability of 
telecommunications in rural areas was utilized as a means to foster development and ensure 
inclusive growth.  The conclusion examines lessons that can be learned while operationalizing 
our model, and spells out the impact of our enablers at ground level.  
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POVERTY ALLEVIATION THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS: 
A ROAD LESS TRAVELED FOR BUSINESS, GOVERNMENTS & ENTREPRENEURS 
 
 
Alleviating Poverty through Profitable Partnerships (APPP), a recently published book, 
argues that for-profit multinational enterprises (MNEs) can, and do have a moral duty to help 
alleviate poverty by establishing profitable partnerships with the poori for mutual gain.  The 
authors rightfully acknowledge that the poor at the “Base of the Pyramid” (BoP) (Prahalad, 
2005; Prahalad and Hart, 2002) must be viewed as more than an additional set of consumers for a 
firm’s products and services—they must also be recognized as valuable producers, employees, 
and service providers themselves. We concur with this premise.  Our intent through this essay is 
to broaden their persuasive argument by filling in what we perceive as potential gaps, and to 
propose additions to further strengthen their thesis. 
The implicit goal, we share with the authors of APPP, is the laudable objective of getting 
the maximum number of people out of poverty in the shortest time.  Accepting, as we do, that the 
optimum way of achieving this is to persuade business (we prefer not limiting our set of actors to 
MNEs, as do the authors of APPP)ii to establish inclusive growth models, our overarching 
research question becomes, “How can the power of business and markets be leveraged to enable 
the eradication of poverty?”  
We have presented our arguments in six sections. In the first section, while investigating 
the role of business and accepting that partnerships are the solution for poverty alleviation 
(Werhane, et al., 2010), we voice certain concerns that we hope will extend the authors’ 
discourse.  We also present a model that we believe can serve as an effective framework for 
addressing these issues.  The second section establishes the imperative of inclusive growth. Here 
we engage with the necessity of formulating strategies that focus not only on the pace but, more 
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importantly, on the pattern of economic growth, including its social and cultural dimensions. We 
also deliberate on the parameters of inclusive growth, with the overriding objective of ensuring 
that multiple strata of society share the benefits of globalization.  
The third section highlights the critical role of institutions in promoting social welfare. 
Here we deliberate the impact of government policy vis-à-vis the leverage enjoyed by other 
social institutions. Despite the underlying reality that state and private interests are often at 
loggerheads, we argue that government must still be an integral part of the solution matrix (see 
also footnote 4). 
In the fourth section we illustrate how entrepreneurship can be unleashed to tackle 
endemic poverty prevalent in the BoP. The fifth section describes an in-depth case study in 
which the availability of telecommunications in rural areas was utilized as a means to foster 
development and ensure inclusive growth.  Section six discusses a few lessons that can be 
learned while operationalizing our model, and spells out the impact of our enablers at ground 
level.iii  
EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT: THE POWER OF BUSINESS 
…in recent years business has become the predominant institution in the social landscape, 
eclipsing family, polity, community, and church in importance. 
(Lewin and Stephens, 1993: 401) 
 
Werhane, et al. (2010) initiate their argument with an overview of the extent and 
distribution of poverty.  Suffice to say, in the limited space we have here, that the problem is 
both widespread and devastating.  We wish to begin by addressing a definition of this 
phenomenon—how it is framed—because any attempt to engage with a problem depends on its 
conceptualization.  The commonly accepted, narrow definition of poverty is “the lack of what is 
necessary for material well-being—especially food but also housing, land, and other 
assets…leading to physical deprivation” (Narayan, et al., 1999: 26).  Sen (1999) suggested that 
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focusing merely on inadequate income and wealth does not provide a holistic picture. It is more 
pertinent to examine choices, or the lack of them, that the poor are compelled to confront.   
In the same vein, the authors of this paper argue that poverty, which needs to be defined 
more broadly, is life encompassing—not only do people suffer from material shortages but, more 
importantly, encounters severe challenges in virtually all aspects of their lives.  It is a 
multidimensional social phenomenon (Narayan, et al., 1999) characterized as capability 
deprivation from lack of economic opportunities, political freedom, social facilities, transparency 
guarantees, and protective security (Sen, 1999).  
Sen’s freedoms are critical to our argument that business can and must adopt the role of a 
facilitator in aiding the poor out of poverty, but it cannot conceivably assume this responsibility 
by itself.  Other social institutions need to be intimately involved as well.  To illustrate our point, 
let us examine the situation of Mufia Khatoon, as described at the beginning of APPP: 
Mufia Khatoon is from a small village in Bangladesh.  She was married by her father at 
age thirteen to a fisherman, Jamiruddin, and went to live with his family, as is the 
tradition in Bangladesh.  While he was at sea, Mufia’s mother-in-law verbally abused her 
and made sure she received little to eat.  When Jamiruddin was at home, he often beat 
Mufia.  Suffering from malnutrition and anemia, she had three miscarriages, but finally 
gave birth to three children.  The beatings and semi-starvation continued until a village 
elder arranged for a divorce.  Now Mufia was free, but very poor.  She received no 
support from her former husband for herself or the children, and she was reduced to 
begging in order to survive (Yunus with Jolis, 2003: 67-68). 
 
Clearly Mufia suffers the traditional understanding of poverty, and falls within the 
category of physical deprivation previously defined by Narayan, et al., (1999).  But Sen would 
point out that she is hardly free in other aspects of her life:  she is illiterate, she had no say in 
reproductive choices, she had no choice in her personal relationships, her physical safety is often 
threatened, as a female she has insufficient political options, authorities provided her with little 
protective security, and so on.  To combat Mufia’s poverty, she must gain more than the 
economic security that profitable partnerships can provide.  Indeed, it is impossible to achieve 
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economic security without also acquiring Sen’s other aspects of freedom.  Significant social 
institutions such as the government, family, education, and religion must also be involved and 
help change the social fabric to enable her to have the choices that Sen envisions. We expand on 
this issue in the section titled “Role of Institutions.”  
Second, Werhane, et al. (2010) point out that the poor are experts in the forces and 
processes that bind them into poverty, and that they must be full partners in pursuing any 
solutions.  Recognizing that MNEs must find a way to fully engage with the poor for profitable 
partnerships to evolve, these scholars point to the use of moral imagination (Werhane, 1999) as a 
means to allow executives to view them in this light.  Once this view is established, it will allow 
deep dialogue to occur between MNEs and the poor. “Perhaps ironically, deep dialogue is a well-
developed skill for business, since most MNEs have a great deal of marketing sophistication to 
take customer viewpoints seriously.  However, unless and until Mufia is viewed as a potential 
consumer, those marketing skills are unlikely to shape the design and distribution of the products 
and services she needs” (Werhane, et al., 2010: 26). 
We see at least two issues of concern in the authors’ contention that MNEs can pursue 
profitable partnerships on their own accord.  First, the description of MNEs skill at deep dialogue 
is, as pointed out, a marketing tool aimed at consumers.  For the poor to rise out of poverty, they 
must be more than consumers of the firms’ products, as correctly noted in other parts of the 
book.  It is arguable whether a marketing skill geared toward getting consumers to buy products 
will translate into a vehicle that can produce mutually beneficial business partnerships. 
Second, we are hesitant to believe whether business, on its own initiative and in the 
absence of an external catalyst, will provide the type of negotiating interface necessary to form 
profitable partnerships.  We question whether business has built the mechanisms (Collins, 1997) 
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needed to make a true dialogue with the poor possible.  As Stone (1975) illustrates, such 
interfaces between corporations, especially large ones like MNEs, and individuals are rare.  
Currently the poor have no corporate representation through which they can negotiate effectively 
with business—there is no countervailing power for the poor (Galbraith, 1952). 
Our third concern with the arguments in APPP is the excessive reliance placed on moral 
imagination (Werhane, 1999) in motivating business entities to add eradicating poverty to their 
list of top priorities.  We have no dispute with the desire for business leaders to have and utilize 
moral imagination.  Clearly, enlightened business leaders are beneficial for society at large.  
However, we view moral imagination as a necessary, but not sufficient characteristic to bring 
about the kind of changes required to significantly impact poverty.  We concur with the view that 
“it is certainly within the responsibility of an organization’s leaders to develop socially 
responsible practices, but the nature of industry and the institutional environments in which 
organizations exist jeopardize the competitiveness of organizations that implement such 
practices….Although such calls [for corporate social responsibility] are laudable and planted in 
solid ethical ground, an organization’s leaders, however enlightened and empathetic, must be 
responsive to the competitive forces emanating from their industry and institutional 
environments” (Delios, 2010: 25-26).  For business leaders to include alleviating poverty as an 
additional goal of their operations, even if done through profitable partnerships, will require 
them to incur additional discretionary costs in the short term. This would likely reduce current 
incentive pay for these very owners and managers, and many stakeholders would object.  
“Markets, shareholders, and bankers are single-mindedly focused on profits, and are notoriously 
impatient” (Delios, 2010: 32). 
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A related concern we have is the role of compassion in the motivation to alleviate 
poverty.  The authors note, “But there is one other important factor that drives visionary 
companies to create profitable partnerships.  Simply put, they engage stakeholders.  Poverty 
alleviation is uplifting.  Compassion is a universal human emotion, and it is activated in people 
who engage in projects that promise to enrich the lives of those who are suffering” (Werhane et 
al., 2010: 3).  Indeed, compassion is a universal human emotion—unfortunately, business entities 
are not human.  Corporate cultures may elevate compassion as a corporate value.  But corporate 
cultures tend to change in the face of financial realities; if corporate finances take a nosedive, 
compassion is likely to be jettisoned in favor of survival.  Senior managers, or the board of 
directors, or shareholders, will do what is necessary to sustain the continued existence of the 
firm.  If they do not, the question of compassion is moot. 
Our final concern with the arguments in APPP is the notion of allowing business to 
define its own ends.  This, in a nutshell, is the root cause of many of the ills confronting society.  
Business is unparalleled in ensuring efficiency and creating wealth (Hertz, 2001). A significant 
reason for this is the narrow definition and constricted set of goals—namely the pursuit of 
profit—under which businesses have typically been allowed to operate. This constrains (or 
permits) them to focus on those markets that can best fulfill the firms’ limited objectives, while 
largely ignoring the poor, who, in all likelihood, are not consumers. 
The amoral theory of business views the economic institution as separate from other 
social institutions, largely insulated from all of the moral norms adhered to by the rest of society 
(Shepard et al., 1995).  The economic institution has been separated morally in certain significant 
ways from other social institutions such as the church, the state, the community, and the family.  
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As a result, it has largely come to be exempt from some generally accepted norms.  Or, as some 
scholars have observed, economic norms have become the only ones that matter (Harris, 1999). 
Emile Durkheim, like other early sociologists, had seen the effects of the profound 
disruption of society engendered by the shift just outlined, including the growing separation of 
the economy from the rest of society.  “For two centuries economic life has taken on an 
expansion it never knew before.  From being a secondary function, despised and left to inferior 
classes, it passed on to one of first rank” (Durkheim, 1937/1996: 11).  Durkheim explored the 
problems of an advanced, complex society in which the economy had become so detached from 
other social institutions that it became an end in itself.  He wrote that in Western societies neither 
government nor society held moral sway over the economic institution; a state of anarchy within 
the economic sphere was therefore inevitable.  He made several references to “the anarchy of the 
economy” in this work (a concept virtually identical to the amoral theory of business).  
According to Durkheim, “We can give some idea of the present situation by saying that the 
greater part of the social functions (and this greater part means to-day the economic—so wide is 
their range) are almost devoid of any moral influence…” (Durkheim, 1937/1996: 29).   Authors 
of more current work also note that the separation thesis “tries to separate business activities 
from ethics and seeks to make sense out of corporate responsibility as a discretionary idea” 
(Werhane et al., 2010: 5). 
Self-interest, as philosophers throughout the ages have observed, is a powerful motivator.  
If one is allowed to choose one’s own ends, without constraints, it is likely that self-interest will 
play a central role therein.  That same actor is also likely to develop highly effective means of 
achieving those ends.  Allowing business to define its own ends has resulted in an institution that 
has established strong self-interested goals and incredibly efficient means of achieving them. 
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Although the establishment of checks and balances is widely viewed as a logical means of 
avoiding concentrations of power in other social realms, business has somehow evaded this 
concept, and has become a dominating force, while pursuing its own narrowly constrained ends.  
To add insult to injury, business has also been able to shift social costs to the broader society by 
avoiding the costs of externalities (Hacker, 2008). 
If, as we suspect, the amoral theory of business is the dominant paradigm, it is difficult to 
visualize how a continued “hands off” approach will result in firms voluntarily adopting poverty 
alleviation as a core value.  As long as firms perceive their role primarily as economic actors, 
while the state and civil society are expected to bear the onus of poverty alleviation efforts, 
growth will be neither inclusive nor sustainable. 
A framework for addressing these issues 
Our proposal rests on a few suppositions:  1) Self-interest and compassion are both 
universal human emotions—but when in conflict, self-interest usually trumps compassion.  2) 
Business entities do not have compassion in the same sense that individuals do.  Compassion can 
be a corporate value, embedded in the firm’s culture, but when financial difficulties arise, 
corporate survival overrides culture.  3) If suppositions 1 and 2 are accurate, it is unlikely that 
business leaders and other members of society will “change our shared narratives about global 
free enterprise” (Werhane et al., 2010: 1).  Experience shows that economic systems, without 
adequate interventions, provide highly stratified outcomes to different socioeconomic classes.  
“Left to themselves, economic forces do not work out for the best except perhaps for the 
powerful” (Galbraith, 1973: xiii). 
-------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
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-------------------- 
We propose a model (see Figure 1) that has four enablers addressing our concerns. The 
model’s commencement is in cell 1.  As we have previously argued, left to its own ends, 
business is unlikely to choose alleviating poverty as one of its priorities.  Therefore, we suggest 
that other institutions must create the milieu for business to establish inclusive growth patterns in 
its planning and operations.  Combating poverty has been attempted for generations, albeit with 
limited success.  We intend to move beyond effort to attainment.  The state, accompanied by 
other social institutions, has significant roles to play to ensure this pleasant outcome.iv 
In Cell 2 inclusive growth is recognized as a strategy to maximize citizens’ welfare.  As 
discussed earlier, this can best be achieved by ensuring freedom of choice in concurrence with 
economic security.  The focus, as further elaborated in our discussion, must consequently be on 
both the pace and pattern of economic growth.  This will ensure that outcomes are broad based 
and cover multiple sectors of the economy.   
In cell 3 we propose that it is mandatory for business, even from a self-serving 
perspective of ensuring its own long-term survival, to recognize the necessity of social 
development while continuing to be profitable.  If, as we have presumed, it is unable or reluctant 
to alter the dominant paradigm by itself, other entities must facilitate this.  For example, we have 
previously noted the importance of a countervailing power (Galbraith, 1952) to represent the 
poor in negotiating with business.  This need arises due to the lack of a negotiating interface and 
power differentials between the parties.  If profitable partnerships are to work beyond 
maintaining the status quo and actually address poverty in a meaningful way, we must ascertain 
that the poor are indeed beneficiaries of the union.   
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 This finally leads to cell 4 of our model wherein large firms operating in BoP markets 
succeed in collaborative entrepreneurship efforts, resulting in a significant impact on poverty 
alleviation efforts.  They achieve this laudatory, and mutually beneficial, objective by 
establishing relationships with need-based entrepreneurs.  We elaborate upon this in the relevant 
section. 
 The model has a virtuous cycle.  Institutions provide the impetus for the promulgation of 
inclusive growth strategies intended to impact poverty.  In this ambience, firms are encouraged 
to leverage the power of collaborative entrepreneurship and include the poor in their supply 
chain.  As they discover a positive impact on their bottom line and under pressure from 
stakeholders and managers, they redouble their efforts towards this end.  Finally, social 
institutions, ascertaining success in achieving their intended outcomes, will likely seek further 
interventions to ensure that inclusive growth strategies become the de facto paradigm. While 
these enablers play out, the poor, experiencing an enhancement in their daily lives, are 
supportive of government policies and more likely to vote for incumbent policy makers.  
 This, we hope, will ultimately lead to significantly alleviating poverty, fulfilling 
Mohammed Yunus’s ideal of eradicating poverty and placing it in a museum (Nobel Peace Prize, 
2006). 
INCLUSIVE GROWTH  
…wealth is clearly not the good we are seeking, since it is merely usefu, for getting something else. 
Aristotle (2000: 7) 
 
Governments worldwide, irrespective of political affiliation, should be concerned with 
maximizing their citizens’ welfare. We understand and appreciate the desire of the state to 
improve the well being of its population.  However, as discussed earlier, policy makers’ limited 
focus on income deprivation—as reflected by traditional measures like gross domestic product 
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(GDP) or the more recently used purchasing power parity (PPP)—does not accurately capture 
the nuances of this complex affliction. With the advent of welfare economics in the 1980s, it was 
realized that if poverty elimination is the ultimate objective, economic growth and consequential 
wealth generation is only one indicator of its success.  Aristotle’s sage comment, made many 
centuries ago, which we have quoted at the start of this section, is a reflection of that sentiment.  
A word of caution here is appropriate.  We are not economists and hence unable to share 
their overriding concern with Pareto efficiency models.  Our analysis of issues is from a 
management or policy-making perspective, intended to ensure that growth is sustainable over an 
extended period of time.  Our research, through the case study at the end of this paper, clearly 
illustrates that this can best be achieved if growth is inclusive across socio-economic strata, as 
well as broad based over multiple sectors of the economy.  
In line with social choice theory (Arrow, 1951, 1963), it is important to focus on 
individual interests, values, and welfares, and then aggregate that to the level of society. Our 
argument is that there is crying need for a change of focus from a firm level of analysis to 
understanding the plight of individual citizens and the impact that globalization has on their 
lives.  It is necessary to place people at the center of the development process rather than 
concentrating on markets. Towards this end we propose that policy makers should focus not only 
on the pace but, equally importantly, on the pattern of growth. Our contention is that it is 
imperative that growth covers multiple sectors of the economy and all citizens enjoy its benefits. 
While economists use terms like broad based growth, shared growth and pro-poor growth, we 
suggest that inclusive growth, besides having a focus on the pace and pattern of growth 
(Ianchovichina and Lundstrom, 2009), also be concerned with its sustainability over an extended 
period.   
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We accept the argument that a high pace of growth over extended periods of time can 
significantly contribute to poverty reduction (Dollar and Kraay, 2002).  However, our concern is 
that the advantages offered by globalization may be lost if there is a perception that the 
marginalized poor are not stakeholders in growth.  In this context, the inequalities in wealth 
distribution witnessed in the developed world often pale into insignificance with the stark 
disparities prevalent in emerging markets like China and India.  The fact that significant 
population segments have historically been involved in marginal agriculture or trapped in low 
productivity activities aggravates the problem. This often leads to a perception that the 
opportunities of globalization, and the consequential opening of markets, are well beyond their 
grasp. This in turn fuels dissatisfaction, ultimately leading to social strife. 
We refer to a few recent manifestations of this phenomenon to justify our arguments. The 
red shirt movement in Thailand was, in part, a result of the alienation of the rural poor. Similarly, 
the communist-backed armed Naxalite movement in large tracts of central India is a sign of the 
underlying hostility of indigenous tribes toward industrialization when their mineral-rich lands 
are acquired by the state on behalf of MNEs.  Finally, the spate of attacks on schoolchildren in 
China once again reinforces the need for sensitivity on these issues.   
Inclusive growth embodies not only the economic facets of development, but also its 
social and its cultural dimensions. We hence suggest that in addition to its pace and pattern, a 
critical element of inclusive growth is the creation of employment opportunities for all citizens, 
especially traditionally marginalized groups.  It is only through this inclusion that we can 
proactively ensure the widespread benefits of economic growth.  This approach is in contrast to 
supply side economists, who have long argued in favor of trickle-down policies of development.  
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De Soto, who is often credited with eliminating the Shining Path guerrilla movement in 
Peru, argued that no society could possibly have a strong market economy as long as a majority 
of its population was excluded from mainstream activities. He pointed out “the existence of such 
massive exclusion generates parallel economies, legal and extra legal. An elite majority enjoys 
the economic benefits of the law and globalization while the majority of entrepreneurs are stuck 
in poverty where their assets—adding to more than US $10 trillion worldwide—languish as dead 
capital in the shadows of the law” (Institute of Liberty and Democracy, 2010). 
 Another concern we voice is the prevalence of a vast urban-rural divide. There exists a 
real danger of the rural poor getting isolated from markets, not only economically but also 
psychologically.  While this is often viewed as a lack of adequate skills and income deprivation, 
equally important are factors like the absence of physical infrastructure, paucity of credit, and the 
prevalence of an information asymmetry about the very existence of markets.  Our research 
corroborates that, contrary to popular belief, the rural poor are extremely entrepreneurial, but 
limited by lack of opportunity and choices.  Beyond geographic isolation, they are additionally 
disadvantaged by substantially lower initial starting conditions.  As long as these disparities 
persist, growth may not be sustainable and may even lead to the social tensions to which we have 
previously referred.    
 The lack of opportunity in rural areas has another manifestation—migration to urban 
centers in search of gainful employment.  While some studies show that households with at least 
one migrant have been able to reduce their poverty levels (Human Development Report, 2009), 
this poses significant managerial and policy implications.  Migration can be an urban planner’s 
nightmare, with issues ranging from urban squatting and environmental degradation, to health 
challenges like sanitation and availability of potable water.  Recent studies paint an extremely 
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bleak picture and warn of urban decay and a declining quality of life for citizens with the urban 
transformation occurring in Asia (McKenzie Global Institute, 2010).  Significantly, the study 
also observes that cities can be critical for inclusive growth if they offer improved access to jobs, 
markets and urban infrastructure.  
ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
Institutions influence government policies, which in turn influence growth and distribution 
outcomes, which then affect the pace of poverty reduction. 
(Deolalikar et al., 2002: 6) 
 
We are concerned that the proposed solutions offered by the authors of APPP tend to 
focus almost exclusively on the role of economic actors.  This, in all likelihood, is due to space 
constraints and the inability to address all aspects of a complex system at once.  However, we 
would like to see additional emphasis on related institutional roles in addressing this multifaceted 
predicament.   
There has, over the years, been a debate on whether the state, represented by the 
government, or markets embodied by business, is better equipped to ensure growth.  We 
recognize that the scope of this discussion is well beyond our paper.  However, it is important to 
recognize that, especially in an emerging market context, there is an imperative to lift large 
numbers out of poverty in as short a time as possible.  This, in our opinion, makes it mandatory 
for institutions to work jointly.  We propose that, given the size and nature of the problem, the 
appropriate debate is how these two institutions can complement each other’s roles, rather than 
which is better equipped to accelerate economic development. 
We also appreciate the multiple perspectives on the role of the state.  Governments were 
traditionally viewed as facilitators of economic development. They were expected to ensure a 
coherent regulatory environment, implement property rights and maintain efficient civic services. 
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However, in emerging markets they often pursue intervention, such as state ownership and 
agricultural supports, to serve political ends rather than for larger social welfare.  Some 
researchers have been even more skeptical of their role, dubbing the descriptive model (what 
governments actually do, contrasted with what they should do) as evidence of  “The Grabbing 
Hand” theory of governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).  
As explained in footnote 4, we recognize that there are instances in which the 
government is either too corrupt or dysfunctional to be an effective source of moral and practical 
leadership.  This unfortunate reality further strengthens our call for inclusion of other social 
institutions in addressing the alleviation of poverty.  In such instances, it will be necessary for 
ends to be determined by other institutions such as religious groups, the military, or civil society 
represented by institutions like the judiciary.  
Social institutions would also be able to act as countervailing powers on behalf of the 
poor.  Religion, for example, has historically been concerned with caring for the less advantaged 
among its believers.  The education system is also a logical candidate to advocate for the poor as 
part of its mission.  As we noted previously, poverty is a broad-based, complex problem, 
embedded in a variety of interconnecting systems.  There is thus a pressing need to explicitly 
bring additional social institutions into the solution matrix to help address this complexity (Sud 
et al., 2009).  
To accomplish their role as protectors of and advocates for their citizens, governments 
must provide the impetus, through policy incentives and sanctions. This will ensure that 
businesses operating in their jurisdictions implement inclusive growth strategies that incorporate 
the poor in meaningful and mutually beneficial ways. In response to their expanded affluence, 
the poor, who are large in numbers, will support the government’s regulations, and will be more 
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likely to vote for candidates who support these measures, hence completing the virtuous cycle.  
Thus, our model presents an opportunity to create a system in which we “find approaches that 
meet the needs of the poor in ways that generate profits for business and votes for politicians” 
(Gates, 2007: 1). 
Delios (2010) appropriately observed that government regulation is no panacea for 
business, especially when different jurisdictions have dissimilar or even contradictory rules.  He 
contends that business leaders need to proactively lobby governments to create “an environment 
of formal and informal norms that promotes a harmonization in cross-national standards for 
levels of social responsibility” (Delios, 2010: 26).  We view his proposal in the same way we see 
relying on moral imagination to bring about needed social change—an extremely well 
intentioned idea, but unlikely to really happen.  Therefore, we propose that governments take the 
first step toward inclusive growth strategies, and then rely on business to promote uniformity of 
regulation across jurisdictions. 
COLLABORATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
If we stop thinking of the poor as victims or as a burden and start recognizing them as resilient and 
creative entrepreneurs and value conscious customers, a whole new world of opportunities can open up.                                                                                                                
Prahalad, C. K. (2005: 25) 
 
At first glance the intuitive correlation between entrepreneurship and economic 
development is that entrepreneurs, recognizing opportunities, start new businesses, creating jobs 
that ultimately fuels economic growth.  However being a multi-faceted phenomenon, the reality 
is much more complex.  Acs and Varga (2005) hypothesized that if entrepreneurship includes 
any type of self-employment, the inverse relationship might even hold true; i.e., a high level of 
entrepreneurship may be indicative of slow economic growth. This may arise if bottlenecks exist 
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that discourage new firm formation or as a consequence of institutional failure, both of which 
manifest themselves in high unemployment rates.  
It is thus mandatory to understand the nature of entrepreneurial activity prevailing in 
varied economic settings. Developed markets have high technology agglomerations, where 
entrepreneurs acting on unexploited opportunities create wealth.  The classic example is Silicon 
Valley, which has spawned a number of regional counterparts the world over.  Unfortunately, the 
ground reality, in some emerging markets, is often vastly different, where substantial numbers of 
the population are either underemployed or unable to find regular employment.   
 In order to better understand the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic 
development, a multi-country Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey was initiated in 
1999.  As comparable national data over an extended period became available, researchers soon 
realized that entrepreneurship varied significantly with economic development.  In factor driven 
economies, i.e., those with low levels of economic development (Porter et al., 2002), researchers 
identified need or necessity based entrepreneurship, wherein the poor are propelled into self-
employment due to lack of opportunities (GEM, 2009).  
This is vastly different from the innovation-based entrepreneurship referred to previously. 
Classical economic theory dictates that as economic development occurs and industrial activity 
picks up, there will be a decrease in self-employment, due to the division of labor.  The growth 
cycle ultimately leads to a mature economy accompanied by a rise of opportunity-based 
entrepreneurship.  This encourages creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1976) wherein 
entrepreneurs discover new and more creative ways of manufacturing products and providing 
services, thereby sustaining long-term economic growth.  Interestingly, emerging markets have a 
prevalence of both types of economic activity, i.e., the presence of need and opportunity-based 
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entrepreneurship prevalent in different geographic regions.  An example here is the existence of 
the so-called “Silicon Plateau,” a description often given to India’s technology capital, 
Bangalore, with its high growth start-ups and plethora of outsourcing firms.  A few hundred 
miles in the rural hinterland, the ground reality is often harshly different.  
 The GEM report concludes that for “factor driven economies, getting the basic 
requirements right is key to the generation of sustainable businesses that can contribute not just 
to local economic activity but to health and education of the next generation” (GEM 2009: 11).  
We hence propose that in order to significantly impact poverty alleviation, firms must leverage 
need-based entrepreneurship, and include the poor in their supply chain.  This is in line with 
Prahalad’s (2005) thinking at the start of this section.   
The term collaborative entrepreneurship (Miles et al., 2005) was envisioned as a multi-
firm network of small and medium firms that could gain a competitive advantage by enabling 
entrepreneurship beyond firm boundaries.  We, however, envision this collaboration at an 
entirely different level—one between large firms and need-based entrepreneurs operating in the 
BoP segment. The power of this collaboration, if accompanied by appropriate institutional 
intervention, can significantly impact poverty.  There are a number of examples of this success in 
our case study. 
We intentionally suggest that large firms are better positioned to enable entrepreneurship, 
for three reasons.  First, given the multiple constraints in BoP segments, there is a pressing need 
for substantial investment with patient capital to achieve this objective.  Simultaneously, firms 
will have to work with entrepreneurs on the ground to be able to transfer adequate knowledge 
and the skills that entrepreneurship mandates.  Given resource constraints and shorter term 
planning horizons, small and medium firms are less likely to able to succeed in this endeavor.  
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Second, alliances with need-based entrepreneurs must be over an extended time horizon, 
before results at the ground level become apparent.  This places large firms, with their greater 
operational and financial stability, and the brand recognition they enjoy, at an advantage.  From 
the entrepreneurs’ perspective, this leads to a higher degree of confidence and consequently a 
greater willingness to invest in the relationship.     
Finally, large firms are in a better position to benefit from both economies of scale 
(through increased volume procurement at multiple locations) and scope (through synergies and 
by increasing the capacity and purview of the firm), ultimately leading to a mutually beneficial 
relationship. This will ensure sustainability and impact poverty alleviation by encouraging 
investment in other critical areas like health and education, as envisioned in the GEM 
recommendation we referred to earlier.   
  The next section provides an overview of the results that can be achieved from these 
collaborative entrepreneurial efforts in the case of the Indian telecom industry. 
CASE STUDY 
India’s telecom revolution: Strategy for inclusive growth 
The success of the sector can be attributed in no small part to the strong regulatory environment provided 
by the Government. The policy initiatives coupled with numerous growth oriented steps taken by private 
players and other stakeholders, have created a truly stimulating environment….today every fifth person in 
rural India is connected; from wage earners to shopkeepers; farmers to fishermen; mobile phones are 
helping in increasing their productivity. 
(Indian Telecom 2009, quoting a senior officer, Department of Telecom, GoI)  
  
 India, soon after gaining independence from the British in1947, opted for a mixed 
economy with a socialistic pattern of development.  The Government of India (GoI), through a 
labyrinth of laws and regulations, carefully controlled industrial output and impacted citizens’ 
daily lives in numerous ways.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) was controlled and domestic 
companies largely protected from foreign competition.  During this period, often referred to as 
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the “license raj,” state policies emphasized import substitution and resulted in a system of 
governance in which corruption and control were endemic.  Telecom was largely a government-
controlled monopoly with low penetration levels and extremely poor service.   
 In 1991, with the economy rapidly collapsing, debt levels reaching unserviceable levels, 
and barely enough foreign exchange to cover a few weeks of imports, GoI reversed track and 
decided to implement market friendly economic policies. A decision was also made to 
proactively pursue strategic interventions in the telecom sector, in line with a desire to spur 
economic development and ensure inclusive growth.  A national telecom policy was formulated 
to serve as a blueprint towards this end and participation invited from both domestic and foreign 
players to ensure that market forces prevailed.   
Soon after opening up the sector, an independent regulator—Telecom Regulating 
Authority of India (TRAI)—was established.  TRAI was mandated to establish tariffs, advise on 
introducing new technologies, and protect consumers by ensuring adherence to guidelines and 
service benchmarks.  TRAI, through extensive nationwide public hearings, consulted with civil 
society, social institutions and private citizens in formulating its bylaws.  GoI also invested it 
with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate and settle disputes and ensure fair competition in the 
market.  
 In 1994, with state owned enterprises continuing to operate in this sector, private bids 
were invited for services in four metropolitan areas and eighteen non-metro circles. Telecom 
companies, based on projections of a large urban middle class population with discretionary 
spending, quoted huge license fees.  Tariff rates were proportionally expensive, resulting in poor 
demand.  The problem was accentuated by the high cost of mobile handsets and large 
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investments needed to set up infrastructure. Given this scenario, by 1998 the entire industry was 
on the brink of bankruptcy. 
TRAI intervened and a new telecom policy was enunciated. License fees were waived 
and the entire industry moved to a revenue sharing model.  This strategic move allowed for the 
entry of a larger number of mobile operators into each telecom circle.  TRAI also ensured 
convergence of technology to enable economies for the entire industry.  In 2003 a “calling party 
pays” regime was introduced which further boosted demand.  With lower tariffs, increased 
competition and a rapidly growing economy the market eventually began picking up.   
Over the past two decades India’s telecommunication network has grown to be the 
second largest in the world.  The mobile subscriber base alone has increased from a little over 5 
million in 2001 to 584 million in March 2010 (India Telecom, 2009).  Prevailing tariffs are as 
low as two cents per minute as compared to thirty cents in the developed world.  The industry, 
often labeled a “poster boy” of successful economic liberalization policies, is expected to reach a 
size of $77 billion by 2012 and generate employment to ten million people both directly and 
indirectly.  
 Rural inclusion 
 Initially, fast growing urban areas were the focus of interest of telecom providers.  It was, 
however, the rural population that GoI sought to actively engage with as part of its inclusive 
growth agenda.  Indian villages, home to 70 percent of India’s population, are widely disbursed 
and often lack vital infrastructure.  Attempting rural penetration hence posed significant 
challenges.  Hurdles confronting telecom providers included affordability, average revenue per 
user, low literacy levels, and lack of locally relevant content (news, weather alerts, etc.).  Clearly, 
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market forces proved inadequate to spur investment in these areas with all players, including 
state owned enterprises, displaying a marked reluctance to fulfill any social responsibility.  
Meanwhile social institutions highlighted that broadband connectivity and mobile 
telephony in rural areas could offer multiple advantages like improved growth in 
literacy/vocational skills, increase in employment, real time health care, etc.  Planners and 
politicians realized that telecom could also help blur the urban-rural divide that had plagued 
Indian since independence.  Independent studies corroborated that improved communication 
technology could facilitate poverty reduction in low-income countries with farmers, fishermen 
and entrepreneurs using mobile phones to improve their livelihoods (Bhavnani et al, 2008).  
 Attempting to tackle these challenges and ensure inclusive growth, a Universal Service 
Obligation Fund (USOF) was set up in 2003.  This bill, approved by a special act of Indian 
Parliament, provided subsidies to private players establishing rural infrastructure.  Any cost 
incurred by operators in offering telecom services in rural areas was reimbursed from the fund. 
Indirectly every urban consumer using the network ended up contributing to the USOF, which by 
2009 had swelled to $5 billion. 
  GoI, from the proceeds of this fund, commenced a massive investment effort in rural 
telecom infrastructure.  Telecom towers were set up, wire line broadband connectivity provided 
to telephone kiosks and fiber optic cable connectivity established.  Companies with expertise in 
decreasing costs and working in remote areas were invited on a pilot basis to demonstrate their 
technology with the stated intention of placing orders with successful bidders.  A broadband 
policy was enacted in 2004 to spur Internet growth in the country, which in turn was expected to 
be a key driver of inclusive economic growth. 
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 The private sector meanwhile, soon realized the multiple technological advantages that 
broadband offered.  From their perspective it also provided access to large numbers of 
geographically disbursed customers at extremely competitive costs.  Firms soon began operating 
in multiple domains as widely disbursed as mobile banking, tele-education, financial and 
agricultural services, e-governance, telemedicine, health and veterinary services, etc. 
Despite the success, a word of caution is, however, appropriate, as this case has not been 
without its share of controversies.  The Comptroller and Auditor General, an internal wing of the 
government that routinely scrutinizes policy implementation, has pointed to substantial losses as 
a result of 2G spectrum width being allocated to some telecom providers in 2008 without 
following a transparent bidding process.  The country’s supreme court has recently intervened 
and is now hearing the matter.  The minister in charge has also resigned.  
These recent developments serve to reinforce our argument for the necessity of multiple 
social institutions as an oversight to the government.  
CONCLUSIONS AND A FEW LESSONS 
In this section of the paper we seek to operationalize our model and draw on a few 
lessons that can be learned while doing so.  Figure 2 highlights the impact discernible on the 
ground as the four enablers, working in conjunction with each other, focus on poverty 
alleviation.  In doing so, we examine a few lessons in the context of one particular firm— ITC 
Limited— which has attempted to harness collaborative entrepreneurship in BoP segments for 
nearly two decades.  
---------------------- 
<Insert figure 2 about here> 
--------------------- 
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The first lesson is that both entities, the large firm and the entrepreneur, must find the 
relationship to be mutually beneficial.  ITC, an Indian conglomerate seeking to expand its 
footprint in commodity trading, gained a competitive advantage in exports as a result of 
substantially increasing its procurement of soya from individual entrepreneur farmers (Sud and 
VanSandt, in press).  Advantages of scale and scope also accrued to them.  The BoP 
entrepreneur, meanwhile, utilized the vastly improved supply chain created by ITC and 
leveraged telecom infrastructure to be able to eliminate an information asymmetry and connect 
directly to markets.  This enabled the entrepreneur to be extricated from an unproductive cycle 
that had long indebted him to rent seeking middleman and usurious village moneylenders.  This 
virtuous cycle has resulted in an unintended, but certainly non-trivial, benefit to the large firm.  
As a direct consequence of an increase in their discretionary buying power, BoP entrepreneurs 
have begun purchasing agricultural as well as consumer goods from the rural hypermarkets that 
ITC set up at the distribution centers where it procures the soya.  
This leads us to the second lesson, that of transparency.  Despite massive investments in 
rural infrastructure, ITC gives the entrepreneurs the choice of selling their products anywhere in 
the market.  However, it proffers numerous advantages in terms of immediate payment, accurate 
weighing and saving of multiple handling costs. The entrepreneurs, utilizing the business 
platform (e-Chupal) that ITC has set up, are able to make informed harvesting decisions after 
checking prices prevailing in various markets, including the Chicago Board of Spices.  Thus, 
there is complete transparency and freedom of choice in all aspects of the transaction.  As a 
result of these initiatives, need-based BoP entrepreneurs, earlier largely marginal farmers, are 
willing to accept a degree of risk and make substantial investment in fertilizers, insurance, and 
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good farming practices.  This in turn increases their yields, while providing additional volumes 
to ITC.  
The third critical lesson from this successful collaboration is the necessity of a long-term 
vision.  Faced with a non-existent supply chain and inefficient intermediaries, ITC in the early 
1990s had to make substantial infrastructure investments.  They are now doing the same while 
setting up hypermarkets that have long payback periods, but offer a platform into rural India.  
From the entrepreneurs’ perspective, given the numerous events beyond their control (weather 
patterns, cost of inputs, crop prices ruling at the time of harvesting, changing government policy 
on agricultural subsidies, etc.), it is essential to have a long-term planning horizon.  It is also 
important to factor in the reality that BoP entrepreneurs, being less sophisticated and exposed to 
entrepreneurial forces for the first time, are likely to have a steep learning curve. 
 Significantly, ITC’s gains were achieved even as inclusive growth strategies initiated by 
institutional attempts to tackle poverty were beginning to take effect.  The company has been 
very proactive in getting its rural engagement initiative off the ground while GoI’s telecom 
policies were being given their final touches.  This was because ITC visualized a competitive 
advantage in procuring and processing agricultural commodities through its own supply chain. 
In summary, government and/or other social institutions must work with business to 
provide the impetus for profitable partnerships with need-based entrepreneurs, enriching both 
parties to the collaboration and broader society.  Only by working together across geographic 
and institutional boundaries can we hope to fulfill the promise of profitable partnerships and 
alleviate poverty.  Societies have grappled with poverty alleviation literally for millennia; we 
finally have the productive power contained in business to accomplish this task.  Ironically, our 
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efforts to alleviate poverty through profitable partnerships have the potential to help the poor 
while simultaneously enhancing corporate profits. 
 29 
REFERENCES 
Acs, Z. J., and A. Varga: 2005, ‘Entrepreneurship, Agglomeration and Technological Change’, 
Small Business Economics, 24, 323-334. 
Aristotle: 2000, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by R. Crisp, (Cambridge University Press, New 
York). 
Arrow, K. J.: 1951, ‘Alternative approaches to the theory of choice in risk-taking situations’, 
Econometrica, 19, 404-437. 
Arrow, K. J.: 1963, ‘Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care’, American 
Economic Review 53(5), 941–973. 
Barney, J.: 1991, ‘Firm Resources and Sustainable Competitive Advantage’, Journal of   
Management 17(1), 99-120. 
Bhavnani, A., R. W. Chiu, S. Janakiram, and P. Silarszky: 2008, ‘The Role of Mobile Phones in 
Sustainable Rural Poverty Reduction’, ICT Policy Division, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONAND
TECHNOLOGIES/Resources/The_Role_of_Mobile_Phones_in_Sustainable_Rural_Pove
rty_Reduction_June_2008.pdf. 
Collins, J.: 1997, ‘Forget Strategy. Build Mechanisms Instead’, Inc. 19(14), 45-48. 
De Soto, H.: 2000, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else, (Basic Books, New York). 
Delios, A.: 2010,’How Can Organizations Be Competitive but Dare to Care?’ Academy of 
Management Perspective 24(3), 25-36. 
Deolalikar, A. B., A. B. Brillantes, Jr., R. Gaiha, E. M. Pernia, and M. Racelis: 2002, ‘Poverty 
reduction and the role of institutions in Developing Asia’, Asian Development Bank 
 30 
Economics and Research Department ERD Working Paper Series No. 10, 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/ERD/Working_Papers/wp010.pdf. 
Devarajan, S.: 2009, The Wall Street Journal, online edition. July 1. http://online.wsj.com/home-
page. 
Dollar, D., and A. Kraay: 2002, ‘Spreading the Wealth’, Foreign Affairs 81(1), 120-133. 
Durkheim, E.: 1937/1996, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, (Routledge, London). 
Galbraith, J. K.: 1952, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, (Houghton 
Mifflin, Boston). 
Galbraith, J. K.: 1973, Economics & The Public Purpose, Houghton Mifflin, Boston). 
Gates, W.: 2007, Harvard commencement speech transcript, 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/060807-gates-commencement.html?page=1. 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM): 2009, http://www.gemconsortium.org/. 
Hacker, J. S.: 2008, The Great Risk Shift: The new economic insecurity and the decline of the 
American dream, (Oxford University Press, New York). 
Harris, B.: 1999, Steal This Book and Get Life Without Parole, (Common Courage Press, 
Monroe, ME). 
Hertz, N.: 2001, The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy, (The Free 
Press, New York). 
Human Development Report: 2009, ‘Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development’, 
United Nations Development Program, 1-217, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf. 
 31 
Ianchovichina, E., and S. Lundstorm: 2009, ‘Inclusive Growth Analytics: Framework and 
Applications’, The World Bank, Economic and Policy Department, Policy Research 
Working Paper, WPS 4851, 1-16. 
India Telecom: 2009, ‘The Indian Telecom Success Story’, 
http://www.kpmg.de/docs/The_Indian_Telecom_Success_Story.pdf. 
Institute of Liberty and Democracy: 2010, ‘What we Believe’, 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ier2010_embargo2010_en.pd.f 
Lewin, A. Y., and C. U. Stephens: 1993, ‘Designing Postindustrial Organizations: Combining 
Theory and Practice’, in G. P. Huber and W. H. Glick (eds.), Organizational Change and 
Redesign: Ideas and Insights for Improving Performance (Oxford University Press, New 
York). 
McKinsey Global Institute: 2010, ‘India’s urban awakening: Building inclusive cities, sustaining 
economic growth’, McKinsey & Company, 3, 1-213. 
Miles, E. M., G. Miles, and C. C. Snow: 2005, ‘Collaborative Entrepreneurship : A Business 
Model for Continuous Innovation’, Organization Dyanamics, 35(1), 1-11. 
Narayan, D., R. Patel, K. Schafft, A. Rademacher, and S. Koch-Schulte: 1999, ‘Can Anyone 
Hear Us? Voices From 47 Countries’, (Poverty Group PREM, World Bank) 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/335642-
1124115102975/1555199-1124115187705/ch2.pdf. 
Nobel Peace Prize: 2006, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/yunus-lecture-
en.html. 
Porter, M. E., J. J. Sachs, and J. McArthur: 2002, ‘Executive Summary: Competitiveness and 
Stages of Economic Development’, In M. E.Porter, J. J. Sachs, P. K. Cornelius, J. W. 
 32 
McArthurand, and K. Schwab (eds.), The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, 
(Oxford University Press, New York), 16-25. 
Prahalad, C. K. and S. L. Hart: 2002, ‘The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid’, 
Business+Strategy 26(first quarter), 54-67. 
Prahalad, C. K.: 2005, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, (Wharton School Publishing, 
Upper Saddle River, NJ). 
Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales: 2003, Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the 
Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity, (Crown Business, 
New York). 
Schumpeter, J. A.: 1976, Capitalism Socialism and Democracy, (Harper & Row, New York). 
Sen, A.: 1999, Development as Freedom, (Anchor Books, New York). 
Shepard, J. M., J. Shepard, J. C. Wimbush, and C. U. Stephens: 1995, ‘The Place of Ethics in 
Business: Shifting Paradigms?’, Business Ethics Quarterly 5(3), 577-601. 
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny: 1998, The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their 
Cures, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). 
Stone, C. D.: 1975, Where the Law Ends, (Harper Torchbooks, New York). 
Sud, M., and C. V. VanSandt: in press, ‘Of Fair Markets and Distributive Justice’, Journal of 
Business Ethics. 
Sud, M., C. V. VanSandt, and A. Baugous: 2009, ‘Social Entrepreneurship: The Role of 
Institutions’, Journal of Business Ethics 84(Supplement 1), 201-216.  
United Nations Conference for Trade and Development: 2010, ‘ICTs, Enterprises and Poverty 
Alleviation’, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ier2010_embargo2010_en.pdf. 
 33 
Werhane, P. H., S. P. Kelley, L. P. Hartman, and D. J. Moberg: 2010, Alleviating Poverty 
Through Profitable Partnerships: Globalization, Markets, and Economic Well-Being, 
(Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, New York). 
Werhane, P. H.: 1999, Moral Imagination and Management Decision Making, (Oxford 
University Press, New York). 
Yunus, M. with Jolis, A.: 2003, Banker to the Poor: micro-lending and the battle against world 
poverty, (PublicAffairs, New York). 
 34 
 
Figure 1
 35 
 Figure 2 
 
 
 
                                                 
i
 We recognize that persons in poverty are not a monolithic group with identical characteristics and needs.  However, 
lacking a shorthand that adequately captures the multi-faceted nature of these individuals, we will commit the sin of 
referring to them as “the poor.” 
ii
 As the largest and most widely dispersed form of business organization, we acknowledge the special place that 
MNEs have in the fight against poverty.  However, we wish to expand the pool to the entire social institution of 
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“business” because it is arguably the primary driver of economic growth in all its forms.  For example, much of the 
growth in employment comes from small firms.  (Social institutions are those arrangements all societies have that 
channel behavior in prescribed ways; examples are government, religion, education, the family, and the economy). 
iii
 The reader will soon realize that, for an academic essay, our paper has relatively few citations from other scholars.  
We have done this intentionally.  The topic we engage with is not merely an academic discourse—a vast number of 
people’s lives are spent in wretched poverty because government officials, politicians, and private citizens have not 
created solutions to end poverty, or, frankly, to make it a priority to do so.  We hope to provide a fresh perspective 
on and spur actual solutions to the problem. 
iv
 We recognize that there are instances in which the government is too corrupt or dysfunctional to be an effective 
source of moral and practical leadership.  In such instances, it will be necessary for ends to be determined by other 
institutions such as religious groups or the military.  This unfortunate reality only strengthens our call for inclusion 
of other social institutions in addressing the alleviation of poverty. 
 
